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1 Introduction
An Environmental Management System (EMS) can be defined as ”the part of the overall
management system that includes organizational structure, planning activities, responsibil-
ities, practices, procedures, processes and resources for developing, implementing, achiev-
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ing, reviewing and maintaining the environmental policy” (ISO 14001, 1996). An increas-
ing number of firms are opting to conform their EMS to international standards such as
the European Eco-management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and especially the world-wide
standard ISO 14001.
Boiral (2007) suggests two roles of a corporate EMS: first, it can be seen as a way
of publicizing an organization’s legitimacy among various stakeholders -especially if it is
certified according to an international standard- and second, it can be seen as an internal
management tool. Instead of analyzing the publicity effect, that has already been addressed
in the literature (see e.g. Johnstone and Labonne, 2009) we focus on the second effect,
i.e., the role of an EMS as an internal management tool. One essential feature of an EMS
is its voluntary nature, in the sense that its adoption is not imposed by the government,
but is a free decision of the firm. This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the firm’s
decision to adopt an EMS and the choice between a standardized EMS and an informal
one, focusing on the internal organization aspects. It also explores the interactions of these
decisions with environmental regulation.
The main aspect we want to emphasize is the fact that a standardized EMS improves
internal control at the cost of introducing a certain degree of rigidity. We do so by building
a theoretical model of a firm that needs to curb its emissions while facing an uncertain
environment as well as an internal agency problem. We assume that pollution reduction
can be undertaken in two polar ways: one characterized by imperfect internal control (due
to information asymmetry) but higher flexibility, and other one providing a better internal
control by giving up some flexibility.
The first option is to implement some ad-hoc system (labeled as Informal) by con-
tracting an expert (the ”manager”) and giving him the freedom to make the abatement
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decisions. The advantage of this approach is that the expert is able to make quicker de-
cisions without being constrained by a established protocol. The drawback is that the
firm loses some control and needs to trust the manager, who is more informed than the
firm. We capture this idea by assuming that effort is a discretional decision of the manager
not observed by the firm. This situation entails an asymmetric information problem and,
hence, an incentive scheme is required.
The second option is what we call a Standardized EMS (like EMAS or ISO 14001). As
Bansal and Bogner (2002) stress ”ISO 14001 does not set performance standards. Instead,
ISO 14001 focuses on management processes rather than specific environmental outcomes”
(p. 271). Accordingly, we associate a standardized EMS not to a specific environmental
outcome, but to a certain set of practices, which in our model corresponds to a given
level of abatement effort. We model the idea that a standardized EMS provides a very
structured procedure that gives the firm more internal control by assuming that effort
becomes observable and can be specified in the contract. The disadvantage of this option
is that making changes is now more costly because any modification of the protocol must
follow a more or less rigid procedure and involves a certain amount of paperwork. We
simplify this fact by assuming that effort has to be decided before the uncertainty is
revealed and cannot be modified afterwards.
We explore the pros and cons of each type of EMS at the organizational level and the
connections with public policy. Our most important results are the following. First, those
firms adopting a standardized EMS tend to make more abatement effort, which is consistent
with the common belief that such firms are somewhat greener. But we also conclude that
this higher abatement effort results in lower (expected) emissions only if the incentives
provided by public policy are strong enough, which suggests a complementarity between
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standardized systems and environmental economic policies; and this is our second central
finding. This complementarity is reinforced by the fact that standardized systems are more
prone to be adopted under tougher public policies. Third, a standardized EMS is more
likely to be adopted by well established firms, subject to a lower level of uncertainty. Our
fourth insight is that standardized systems tend to be subject to an endogenous adoption
cost higher than that of informal systems, which seems to be in line with reality.
We also get some insights about public environmental policy in connection to the EMS
adoption decision. First, we point out the possible existence of conflicts between private
and social interests in the sense that firms might have incentives to adopt an EMS that is
not socially optimal, and we analyze how to deal with these conflicts. The most notable
finding in this respect is that, under optimal taxation, big or highly pollutant firms are
more prone to adopt standardized systems, perhaps more than what is social desirable, and
the other way around for small firms. Our final insight is that, under some circumstances,
the introduction of standardized EMS results in a win-win-win situation. In particular, we
identify conditions under which making available the possibility to implement a standard-
ized EMS reduces both social and firms’ costs as well as environmental impact, along with
a tax cut.
Several empirical studies have investigated the motivations of firms to adapt and cer-
tify their EMS according to EMAS or ISO 14001 (Nakamura et al., 2001, Morrow and
Rondinelly 2002, Chan and Wong 2006). These studies identify some ”external” motiva-
tors such as consumers’ pressure or satisfying legal requirements. For our work it is more
relevant a second set of ”internal” motivators. Many firms report that implementing a
standardized EMS introduces some organizational discipline and results in efficiency im-
provements, cost reductions and, to some extent, it can make the firm work better. In a
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study conducted by the University of North Carolina and the Environmental Law Insti-
tute among 50 private and public facilities in the U.S., apart from improving regulatory
compliance or customer pressures, the strongest motivators for EMS standardization were
internal: to integrate pollution prevention programs, improve environmental capability and
enhance employee participation in environmental management activities (UNC ELI, 2001).
In a large-scale survey of companies adopting EMS in Pennsylvania, ”corporate goals and
objectives” and ”economic benefits and improved business performance” where reported
among the most important motivators to adopt an EMS (Florida and Davidson 2001, page
67). Pedersen (2007) identifies cost savings both as a relevant driver and an important
benefit of adopting EMAS.
Several authors point out the existence of information asymmetries associated to pol-
lution control activities (see, e.g., Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagne´ 1993, Sinclair-Desgagne´
and Gabel 1997, Goldsmith and Basak 2001, Ambec and Barla 2002). Johnstone and
Labonne (2009) note that ”environmental management systems and tools may help man-
agers identify and implement the most cost-effective means of meeting their environmental
objectives, allowing for improved performance ... by generating information about both
regulatory requirements and internal environmental practices; by helping to resolve inter-
nal agency control issues which may result in adverse environmental impacts” (p. 721).
Goldsmith and Basak (2001) state that behavioral uncertainties about employee actions
are the key to successful EMS implementation (p. 260). These references support our
claim that a very structured procedure, such as EMAS or ISO 14001, can increase the level
of control of the firm and result in improved managerial efficiency.
Another central point of this article is the existence of some rigidity related to a stan-
dardized EMS. As an advantage of standardized EMS versus command-and-control poli-
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cies1, it has been argued that it is a voluntary approach that gives the companies the
flexibility to develop systems that are appropriate to their operations, characteristics, lo-
cation and levels of risk (Rondinelli and Vastag, 1996). But, on the other hand, it has also
been argued that adopting a standardized EMS can imply some rigidities since it requires
a very structured set of procedures and paperwork at every step of the system. Honkasalo
(1998) states that ”The rigidity of the EMAS scheme and the complicated language of the
text of the regulation can produce difficulties for the firms and hinder them from applying
the system in a creative way” (p. 124). Bansal and Bogner (2002) report that certifying
an EMS for ISO 14001 is neither easy nor cheap. For example, the Niagara Mohawk Power
Station spent six person-months developing its EMS and another 700 hours preparing for
certification. Estimates of the financial cost of certification vary widely, from US$ 10,000
(for smaller, stand-alone sites) to US$ 200,000 (for large industrial sites). On top of the
cost of certification, firms must assume the annual costs of maintaining the documentation.
The Global Environmental Technology Foundation has estimated the cost of auditing and
paperwork to be US$ 5,000 to US$ 10,000 annually per facility. Escapa-Gonza´lez (2004)
identifies bureaucratic work as the main barrier to implement an EMS. Consistent with
these studies, our claim is that, although a standardized EMS gives the firm more flexibility
than a command-and-control policy, it implies giving up some flexibility as compared to
”informal” EMS developed ad-hoc for the firm without any pre-established pattern.
From a theoretical perspective, this paper mainly builds on the principal-agent litera-
ture. We address the firm’s dilemma of delegating a task and providing incentives (what
in our framework corresponds to an informal EMS) or keeping that task centralized (which
1Following standard terminology, by command-and-control policies we refer to direct regulation that
determines allowed and prohibited practices. Important examples include eﬄuent standards or technolog-
ical standards. See, for example, Helfand et al. (2003), p. 275. Sometimes, command-and-control policies
are simply called ”standards”. We avoid this terminology to prevent confusion with the standardized EMS.
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corresponds to the adoption of a Standardized EMS). Aghion and Tirole (1997), Dessein
(2002) or Stein (2002) focus on delegation under costly communication but do not pay
much attention to monetary incentives and effort choice, which are central elements of our
study. A closer approach to ours is followed by Prendergast (2002), in which both delega-
tion and provision of monetary incentives are analyzed at the same time. Different from
that research, we focus on the firm’s decision to adopt an EMS, and the interplay between
firm and regulator’s decisions.
Our work is also related to the literature on measuring agent’s performance based
both on input and output measure. In this respect, see Weitzman (1974), Baker (1992),
Prendergast (2002) or Raith (2008) as key references. Alonso-Paul´ı and Pe´rez-Castrillo
(2012) analyze the presence of Codes of Best Practice as a mechanism that allows to monitor
the manager’s activities while generating a lack of flexibility in the manager’s decision
making. A central message of this literature is that input measures do not give incentives
to use private information (or ”specific knowledge”) but minimizes agent’s income risk,
whereas output-based compensation gives incentive to use that information at the cost of
a higher income risk. Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on the efficiency of
information systems. Adopting either an informal or a Standard EMS is similar to choosing
between two different information systems: one involving incentives on output measures in
which the agent has more discretion to use his specific knowledge and another one based
on input measures, which is more rigid but the firm do not suffer from manager’s discretion
since the manager cannot use his specific knowledge. For the case of a risk averse agent, see
Kim (1995), Demougin and Fluet (2001a) or Fagart and Sinclair-Desgagne´ (2007). For a
risk-neutral agent, which is closer to our approach, see Demougin and Fluet (1998, 2001b).
As far as we know, there are no other papers analyzing EMS adoption in a principal-
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agent model. Actually, we are aware of almost no theoretical articles addressing the firm’s
adoption decision. Johnstone et al. (2007) present a graphical cost-benefit model of abate-
ment and management decisions but there is not an analytical modelling of the internal
management processes of the firm. Goldsmith and Basak (2001) represent an EMS in a
model that is similar to ours but they do not address the adoption decision or the connec-
tion of such adoption with environmental regulation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the main elements
of the model. Section 3 studies the design of contracts under both systems and the firm’s
decision between them. Section 4 addresses public policy in connection to firm’s adoption
decisions. Section 5 summarizes our main policy implications and reviews the empirical
relevance of our predictions. Section 6 concludes and offers some guidelines for future
developments.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic elements
A firm’s emissions flow is denoted by P . In the absence of abatement activities, emis-
sions equal A, which is a firm-specific value understood as the business-as-usual (BAU) or
maximum level of emissions. A can be seen as a measure of the firm’s polluting flow, and
hence, the severity of the environmental problem that we are facing. A summarizes all
those factors that have an influence on the size of the BAU flow of emissions, such as the
size of the firm (ceteris paribus, bigger firms tend to pollute more), the pollution intensity
per unit of output of the activities developed by each firm (A tends to be higher for those
firms in highly polluting sectors) and the technological and internal efficiency of the firms
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(more efficient firms tend to pollute less).2
Emissions can be reduced by some abatement activities developed by a manager who
exerts some effort, e. To capture the imperfect information problem, we assume that the
effectiveness of abatement effort is affected by a random shock x˜,3 that ranges between
0 and an upper bound x¯ > 0. This shock represents uncertainty due to environmental,
market or technical conditions. The resulting level of emissions is given by
P˜ = A− ex˜, (1)
where realized emissions, P , are verifiable ex post. Emissions P causes a damage D (P ),
given by4
D(P ) =
δ
2
P 2, (2)
where δ measures the importance of pollution. Moreover, we assume that emissions are
subject to a per-unit tax equal to t. Thus, tP represents the tax bill of a firm whose
emissions are P . The tax revenue is redistributed to the society by a lump-sum transfer.5
The firm’s aim is to minimize his total expected costs E C, where C = tP +w includes
the tax bill and the manager’s salary, w, if the manager is contracted. The manager’s
2In some parts of the paper it will be useful to refer to A simply as ”size”, but what matters for our
analysis is not the size of output but the size of the emissions flow.
3A tilde denotes a stochastic variable and the same symbol without the tilde represents a realization of
that variable.
4The fact that the damage function is quadratic rather than linear accounts for the fact that typically
marginal damage is increasing with the level of emissions. If one focuses on a specific firm, this second-order
effect tends to be more relevant the bigger is the firm with respect to the whole size of the environmental
problem (e.g., local rather than global pollutants). Alternatively, we can also think of a representative
firm in an activity sector rather than an isolated firm.
5We need to acknowledge that pollution entails some cost for the firm but part of our discussion is
compatible with other interpretations for this cost different from a tax. t can also be interpreted as the
price of emission permits in a cap-and-trade system if the firm is as a price taker or the probability to be
fined for non-compliance. This cost can also obey to other factors such as firm image, consumers’ pressure,
the difficulties to trade with some partners or participate in a competitive tender.
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utility is given by u(w, e) = w − c(e), being c(e) = c e
2
2
the cost of effort, and he will not
accept a contract that provides him an expected utility lower than his reservation value U .
This condition is the so-called Participation Constraint (PC). Formally,
E u(w, e) ≥ U . (PC)
The manager is endowed with a limited liability constraint (LLC), which implies that
no negative transfers are allowed. Formally,
w ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [0, x] . (LLC)
As usual in principal-agent models, we assume that the manager has some specific
knowledge, which means that he is more informed than the firm about the development
of his tasks (see Jensen and Mecking, 1992 and Raith, 2008). We do so by assuming that
the manager has more information about the value of x. Specifically, we assume that
both the manager and the firm know the distribution function F (x), but only the manager
can observe the ex-post realization of x and only after he accepts the contract. This is to
capture the fact that both are subject to some uncertainty when they sign the contract but,
afterwards, the manager has more control over his tasks than the firm.6 µ ≡
∫ x
0
xdF (x)
denotes the mean, σ2 ≡
∫ x
0
(x− µ)2 dF (x) the variance, σ the standard deviation and
ρ ≡ σ
µ
the coefficient of variation of x˜. We do not impose any specific distribution function.
6It is not necessarily the case that the manager is better informed than the firm about random events.
What we claim is that the manager has more information about the way how those events affect the
effectiveness of abatement effort. We also implicitly assume that the existence of specific knowledge makes
it very costly for the manager to communicate this information to the firm. In this sense, our paper is
related to Raith (2008) in several aspects: limited liability, input and output performance measures etc.
However, in his paper effort is contractible and there are only imperfect output measures, while in our
model effort is only ex-ante contractible and output is verifiable. Besides, we do not allow for contracts
on both measures (effort and abatement) simultaneously.
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The private first-best (PFB) corresponds to a situation without informational asym-
metries (or equivalently, a joint optimization problem). The minimization of total costs,
given by taxes and the cost of effort, tP + c(e), gives as a result ePFB = tx
c
.
The abatement activities can be organized according to an informal (I) or a standard-
ized (S) EMS. We say that the firm ”adopts I or S”. We also consider the possibility that
no EMS is adopted, which means that no manager is contracted and no effort is made
(e = 0). We label this case as ”laissez-faire” (LF). Formally, we represent the adoption
decision by a qualitative variable EMS that can take three values: S, I and LF .
2.2 Informal (I) and Standardized (S) EMS
The main feature of an informal EMS that we want to underline is that it is not restricted
to follow a rigid protocol and, hence, it provides more flexibility at the cost of reducing
the level of internal control. This idea is captured by assuming that, under I, the firm lets
the manager decide the level of effort, which is not observable by the firm. The firm must
provide a contract based on verifiable results and the natural candidate is the amount of
abatement (A−P ) or, equivalently, the level of emissions (P ). We assume a linear contract
wI = a+b (A− P ) = a+b(ex), a being the basic salary and b a bonus per unit of emissions
reduced.
Under I the timing of the game is such that the firm offers a salary scheme to the
manager before uncertainty is revealed. If he accepts, the value of x is revealed only to
him and he decides the level of effort. This effort, together with the realization of the
shock, determines emissions and, hence, the manager’s salary and the tax bill. We use
the equilibrium concept of perfect sub-game. In the final stage of the game, the manager
decides e to maximize his utility after observing x, resulting in the following Incentive
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Compatibility Constraint (ICC):
eI =
bx
c
. (ICC)
As a second option, a standardized EMS involves a protocol that provides the firm with
a better control. We model this fact by assuming that effort becomes verifiable and can
be specified in the contract. On the other hand, the obligation to follow a rigid protocol
makes the firm less reactive to changes in the environment because any adaptation of the
system requires a bureaucratic procedure. We capture this idea in a simplified way by
assuming that the firm must decide the level of effort (and include it in the contract)
before the uncertainty is revealed and such level cannot be modified afterwards. Since x is
revealed only after signing the contract, the firm is not able to identify the optimal level
of effort.7 Summing up, S provides more control and avoids incentive rents, but it is more
rigid since effort cannot be adjusted to different values of the shock.8 Under S the firm
offers a contract to the manager (including w and e) before uncertainty is resolved and the
manager exerts the level of effort specified in the contract whatever the realization of the
shock.
3 Optimal Contracts and the Adoption Decision
Consider, first, that the firm adopts I. The firm designs the contract that minimizes her
expected costs taking into account (PC), (LLC) and (ICC). The solution to this problem
7We are implicitly assuming a particular monitoring technology that allows a certain control over
manager’s actions. Other technologies may allow to infer some information about the real state of the
world (see, for instance, Baker 1992). This simple technology allows us to highlight the loss of flexibility
caused by adopting S rather than I.
8Although S is more rigid than I, it is more flexible than a command-and-control policy. In our setting,
a natural way to model a command-and-control policy would be to set a legally required level of effort.
Although, under S, the firm commits to a fixed level of effort, such level is endogenously decided by the
firm, not legally set by the government.
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is given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Adopting I is more profitable for the firm than the laissez-faire (LF) situation
if and only if t > tI , where tI ≡
√
2cU
(σ2+µ2)
. Moreover, under I,
(a) If tI < t < 2tI , the optimal payment scheme is given by (a, b) = (0, tI), contingent
effort is eI =
x tI
c
, the firm’s expected costs are ECI = t
(
A−
√
2(σ2+µ2)U
c
)
+ 2U and the
expected utility of the manager is E u = U.
(b) If t > 2tI , (a, b) = (0,
t
2
), eI =
tx
2c
and ECI = tA−
t2(σ2+µ2)
4c
. In this region, the manager
obtains positive incentive rents, i.e., E u > U .
(c) If t = 2tI the firm is indifferent between both schemes 
Lemma 1 reveals that the firm trades off the cost of hiring the manager and the cost
of paying taxes. When t < tI , emissions charges are very low with respect to U and
contracting the manager is too costly compared to the tax saving that the firm could make
by contracting him. Therefore, it is optimal not to hire the manager and not to abate at
all (eI = 0). Then, emissions are equal to A and the tax bill is tA.
For intermediate values of t (tI < t < 2tI), the tax burden becomes an issue for the
firm and implementing some EMS is preferable to LF. But contracting the manager is
still very costly in relative terms and the firm prefers to offer a contract just good enough
to make the manager accept it, by setting a constant bonus. Such a payment scheme is
enough to encourage the manager to exert a ”low” level of effort (technically, that level just
compatible with the LLC) since incentivizing a higher level would entail accepting that the
manager earns some incentive rents, and the cost of those rents would not be compensated
by the achieved saving on taxes. Thus, in this range, the average level of effort is ”low”
and independent of t, while emissions are constant on t but lower than A.
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Finally, when the tax rate is high enough (t > 2tI), saving on taxes becomes relevant
enough to compensate for the provision of incentive rents and it is optimal to offer an
adaptive bonus, which is increasing with t. The optimal level of effort is increasing and the
resulting level of emissions is decreasing in t. Nevertheless, even in the upper range, the
presence of incentive rents causes that the optimal bonus is b = t
2
, rather than b = t, what
would be required to implement the first best, i.e., the firm chooses not to fully transfer
the tax incentive to the manager.
The fact that a = 0 in both cases means that the firm uses the variable bonus b and
not the basic salary a to satisfy the PC, which is binding in both cases (a) and (b). The
reason why a > 0 is not optimal in this setting is that the firm could increase its profit
by reducing the basic salary and increasing the bonus, while maintaining constant the
expected salary of the manager but inducing a higher level of effort (whatever x). So, one
source of inefficiency in this context lies in the dual role of the bonus, on the one hand, to
give incentives to the manager in order to choose the right level effort and, on the other
hand, to make him accept the contract.
Assume now that the firm adopts S, so effort can be prescribed in the contract. There
is no need for incentives and it suffices to offer a constant basic salary to make the manager
willing to accept. The properties of such a contract are shown in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 Adopting S is more profitable for the firm than LF if and only if t > tS, where
tS ≡
√
2cU
µ
. Moreover, when the firm adopts S,
(a) the effort imposed to the manager is given by eS =
tµ
c
, the salary is wS = U +
t2µ2
2c
and
the manager’s expected utility is always U .
(b) The firm’s expected cost is given by ECS(t) = tA− t
2 µ2
2c
+ U 
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Since the firm does not observe x, the best she can do is to use its unconditional mean.
Note that eS is equal to e
PFB only if the true realization of x is equal to µ. The closer x
is to µ, the more efficient this system is. Conversely, S can perform very poorly when x is
very different from µ.
Adopting S is profitable for the firm only if t is high enough, what entails a minimum
level of effort, associated to t = tS and given by eS ≡
√
2U
c
. Using tS and eS, the minimum
cost of implementing S is wS = 2U , which can be seen as a set-up cost, with the particular
feature that it is not an exogenous amount, but an endogenously determined cost. Note
also tS > tI , i.e., a higher tax is needed to induce firms to adopt S than to adopt I, i.e., S
entails a higher set-up cost than I.
Another difference between the solutions under I and S is that the former depends on
the variance of x while the latter does not. The firm, being risk neutral, is not concerned
by the variance itself. Under I, the firm does care about the variance only because of the
complementarity of effort and the realization of the random shock x (according to (ICC)).
This effect is not present under S since effort is chosen before uncertainty is revealed.
Proposition 1 Given any t ≥ tS, the (certain) level of effort chosen by a firm under S is
not lower than the expected level of effort under I. Formally eS (t) ≥ E eI (t). Moreover,
for a given t, expected emissions under S are lower than under I (formally E PS < E PI)
if and only if both of the following conditions hold:
a) ρ < 1, b) t > te, where te ≡ tS
√
1 + ρ2 > tS 
Proposition 1 states that, under any tax (t being high enough to discard LF) those
firms adopting S exert, on average, more effort than those adopting I. This result is
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consistent with the common belief (also supported by the empirical evidence) that firms
with a standardized EMS tend to be greener. Yet, it is important to make some important
remarks about this claim. First, effort is certain ex-ante under S whereas it is unknown
under I. This implies that, at the individual level, although S−adopting firms exert more
effort on average, this is not necessarily true for two arbitrary firms. If x is high enough,
a firm under I could make more effort than another firm under S. At the more aggregate
level, notice that, depending on the distribution of x, eS (t) ≥ E eI (t) does not necessarily
imply that a majority of firms adopting I exert less effort that S−adopting firms. A
sufficient condition for this result would be that the distribution of x is symmetric. Our
second remark is that a firm might adopt S not (only) due to greenness, but (also) to a
cost saving motive
And third, although those firms adopting S tend to spend more resources on abatement,
it might be the case that they pollute more than firms adopting I. This counterintuitive
result is due to the rigidity introduced by S and the complementarity between e and x.
The impossibility to react to different values of x might generate a loss of efficiency. This
lack of flexibility is more serious when x is very volatile. Actually, if ρ ≥ 1 firms tend
to pollute more under S than under I. Requirement b) in Proposition 1 reinforces the
set-up cost idea introduced above: for S to be more profitable than LF, taxes need to be
”high enough” (t > tS), but they need to be even higher (t > t
e) for S to generate more
abatement than I. This result suggest a complementarity between S adoption and public
policies in the sense that a standardized EMS might be not enough to reduce pollution if
it is not complemented by adequate public incentives.
We study now the adoption decision. If t < tI , from lemmas 1 and 2 we know that LF
is trivially more profitable than S or I. Proposition 2 refers to the non-trivial cases.
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Proposition 2 Assume t ≥ tI . If ρ ≥ 1 it is never optimal for the firm to adopt S. If
ρ < 1 there is a threshold level for the tax rate, t∗, such that it is optimal to implement S
(rather than I) if and only if t ≥ t∗ (with indifference at t = t∗) where t∗ is defined as
t∗ ≡

√
2cU
µ
[
ρ+
√
ρ2 + 1
]
if ρ ∈
(
0,
√
3
3
)
2
µ
√
cU
(1−ρ2) if ρ ∈
[√
3
3
, 1
)

(3)
According to Proposition 2, adoption depends on two elements. First, the relative
volatility of x. When uncertainty is low, adopting S allows the firm to select a level of
effort that, with a high probability, is very close to the first best. So, the loss of flexibility is
not a big problem. If, on the contrary, volatility is high, an informal EMS is more advisable
because flexibility is very important to be able to react to different values of the shock.
A low value of ρ can be interpreted as a framework (say, an activity sector) in which the
abatement technology is well established whereas a high value of ρ might indicate that the
technology is at an early stage of development and subject to larger uncertainty. Another
plausible interpretation is that standardized systems are more prone to be adopted by well
established and mature firms (typically facing lower uncertainty) rather than by newcomer
firms.
The second factor is the tax, what reinforces the idea of complementarity between S
adoption and public incentives. For every value of ρ there is a threshold value of t over
which S is adopted.9 The rationale behind this finding lies in the fact that, under I, the
firm has to balance the objectives of reducing the tax burden and keeping the manager’s
wage low. The presence of incentive rents raises the cost of giving incentives, what dampens
the reaction of the firm to a higher tax rate. This effect is not present under S since effort is
9Notice that t∗ is continuous since both expressions in Proposition 2 take the same value at ρ =
√
3
3 .
17
observable and there are no incentive rents. Thus, the firm is, on average, more responsive
to changes in tax rate under S than under I. This finding reinforces the first result in
Proposition 1 in the following sense: for the same t, firms adopting S exert, on average,
more effort. Moreover, S tend to be adopted when emissions charges are high, which gives
an additional factor to justify why S-adopting firms make more effort: it is likely that
those firms adopting S are subject to higher taxes (or, in general, are more exposed to cost
derived from pollution). Figure 1 illustrates this result.
Corollary 1 If it is optimal for the firm to adopt S, the expected emissions under S are
not higher than the expected emissions under I. Formally, t ≥ t∗ =⇒ E PS (t) ≤ E PI (t)
Corollary 1 states that, although firms adopting S might pollute, on average, more than
firms adopting I (see Proposition 1), it is not expected that cost-minimizing firms would
endogenously adopt S in those circumstances.
4 Social costs and optimal policy
So far we have taken public policy as given and we have focused on the firm’s decision. In
this section we analyze how the environmental authority should set taxes to minimize social
cost. Modifying t has two differentiated effects. First, a marginal effect in the sense that
an increase in t will typically lead firms to increase abatement effort. Second, a qualitative
or discrete effect since changing t might imply a change in the firm’s adoption strategy,
i.e. shifting from I to S or vice versa. We conclude that the combination of these effects
might result in a conflict between private and social interests, in the sense that the social
optimum could not be implemented because it requires the adoption of a particular EMS
whereas the firm is willing to adopt a different one. This conflict is driven by the fact
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that the firm’s and the planner’s preferences are different. The firm is concerned about the
existence of incentive rents, which represent a source of costs for her, whereas these rents
are, per se, not a relevant problem for a social planner since they can be seen as an income
transfer (from the firm to the manager) and, therefore, the aggregate social effect is zero.
On the other hand, the planner is concerned about the social damage caused by emissions,
while the firm is not. We split the optimal policy problem in two stages: determining the
social optima and investigating the possibility to implement them.
4.1 Determining the social optima
We assume that the social planner aims at minimizing expected social costs associated to
emissions, which are given by the abatement cost and the external cost of pollution, D(P ).
Using (2) total social cost is given by10
SC =
c
2
e2 +
δ
2
P 2. (4)
The planner needs to take into account the firm’s decision to adopt S or I. First we
study the optimal value of t under both scenarios and then we determine which one is
socially preferable. To this end, it is useful to introduce a couple of definitions.
Definition 1 A policy, P (EMS, t), is a type of EMS ∈ {I, S, LF} and a tax rate, t.
10Tax revenue and the manager’s salary are not considered as costs, but income transfers, from the
social point of view. As noted by one referee, it can be argued that the manager’s reservation utility, U ,
should be included with a negative sign under LF or, alternatively, with a positive sign under S and I, to
acknowledge the social opportunity cost to divert the manager from another activity. We do not do so for
two reasons. The first is analytical clarity and the second is to assume that the planner only considers those
agents that are effectively involved in the sector and not those that could have been potentially involved
but ultimately are not. This is based on the idea that a proper evaluation of the social opportunity cost
would require more information. For example, in the presence of involuntary unemployment, contracting
the manager creates a new job, which could (totally or partially) counterbalance the opportunity cost. Our
setting can be seen as a worst-case scenario for LF. Including U would make LF to be socially optimal
more often.
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Denote as PLF any policy involving EMS = LF .11
Under LF, we have e = 0 and P = A. In this case social cost is certain and given
by SCLF =
δ
2
A2 for any t. Under S or I the tax rate matters for social cost because it
determines the level of effort and emissions. So, we wonder what is the socially optimal
value of t under each EMS, what corresponds to the notion of Pigouvian tax.
Definition 2 The ”standardized local optimum” or ”S-optimum” is a policy defined by
P
(
S, tS
)
, where tS, is the tax rate that minimizes E SC under EMS = S. Analogously,
the ”informal local optimum” or simply ”I-optimum” is P
(
I, tI
)
, where tI is the tax rate
that minimizes expected social cost subject to EMS = I.
Assume first EMS = S . Using (1) and taking expectations in (4), together with the
fact that under S effort is observable, we get the following expression for the expected
social cost:
E SCS =
c
2
e2 +
δ
2
[
(A− eµ)2 + σ2e2
]
. (5)
Using the expression for eS given in Lemma 2 we can write E SCS in terms of the
tax, and minimizing this function with respect to t, we get the following form for the
(Pigouvian) socially optimal tax under S:
tS =

tS if AS ≤ A < 2AS
Acδ
δ(µ2+σ2)+c
if A > 2AS
(6)
where AS ≡
c+δ(µ2+σ2)
δµ
√
U
2c
is a threshold value of A below which S is never socially optimal.
The first region defined in (6) is a corner solution and the second is interior. The first region
11Since social cost does not directly depend on taxes, under PLF the exact value of t is socially irrelevant
as far as it is low enough to induce firms not to adopt any EMS.
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reveals that, when A is not very high, the optimal policy is to set a tax that is just high
enough to induce the firm to adopt S. Straightforward sensitivity analysis for the second
region reveals that, as expected, tS is higher for big or highly polluting firms (higher A),
when pollution is more harmful (higher δ), when effort is more costly (higher c) and effort
is, on average, less productive (lower µ). It is interesting to underline that tS also depends
negatively on σ2 because, although the private solution of the firm under S does not depend
on the variance (see Lemma 2), the social cost does according to (5). To understand the
effect of σ2, it is useful to interpret abatement effort as an investment. Since the damage
function is quadratic, the social planner prefers certain to uncertain outcomes. When σ2 is
high, the effectiveness of abatement effort is very uncertain, what makes it be less appealing
as an investment and, therefore, less incentives (=taxes) are advisable.
Under I, using Lemma 1 in (4) and taking expectations we get an expression for E SCI
in terms of the tax, and minimizing with respect to t, we get the I-optimum tax rate:
tI =

any t ∈ [tI , 2tI ] if AI ≤ A < 2AI
2Acδ
δ γ
(µ2+σ2)
+c
if A > 2AI
(7)
where AI ≡
c+δ γ
µ2+σ2
δ
√
U
2c(µ2+σ2)
is a threshold value below which I is never socially optimal
and γ ≡
∫
x4dF (x) is the fourth-order non-centered moment of x. The first range of tI
corresponds to the first region of the firms’ optimal solution, when the contract and the
effort do not depend on the tax (see point (a) in Lemma 1). In the second range, the
effect of A, c and δ have the same sign as they had on tS. Nevertheless, the distribution
of x affects tI in a different way. First, note that µ2 and σ2 have a positive rather than
negative effect. The reason is that, unlike under S, the manager reacts to different values
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of the random shock and this adaptive capacity is more important the bigger the size
of the shock and its variability. However, since the tax incentive is not fully transferred
to the manager, the more uncertain the shock is, the more advisable it is to increase
the tax to reinforce the incentive that the manager will ultimately receive. On the other
hand, there is now an additional term, γ, which is related to the kurtosis coefficient.12
For symmetric distributions, the higher γ (and, hence, the kurtosis coefficient) the more
mass of probability is located closely around the mean and in the tails, what induces the
regulator to fix a lower tax, resulting in lower effort. The reason for this effect is the
fact that eI increases linearly with x, whereas the social-first-best (SFB) level of effort is
decreasing for large values of x.13 So, if x is very high, the approximation of I to the social
optimum can be very poor (the firm tends to over-abate), and this event is more probable
the more mass is located in the tails.
Both the S−optimum and the I−optimum can be seen as local optima in the sense that
tS is optimal under S but, in general, it is not optimal under I, and the same applies to tI .
The third local optimum is PLF . We refer to the local optimum with the smallest E SC
as the global optimum or G-optimum. So, the G-optimum, is P
(
S, tS
)
if ES SC
(
tS
)
≤
min
{
SCLF , EI SC
(
tI
)}
and so on.
It is easy to check that LF is the G-optimum if A is small enough; specifically, if
A ≤ AG ≡ min{AI , AS}.
14 The intuition behind this result is straightforward: if A is
12The kurtosis coefficient, defined as
∫
(x−µ)4dF (x)
σ4
, measures the fourth-order centered moment with
respect to the second-order centered moment. Ceteris paribus (taking as fixed the 1st, 2nd and 3rd-order
moments) the kurtosis coefficient is increasing with γ. A high-kurtosis distribution has a sharper peak and
longer, fatter tails, while a low kurtosis distribution has a more rounded peak and shorter thinner tails.
13Specifically, by minimizing SC, we get the social first-best (SFB), eSFB = Aδx
c+δx2 , which depends
positively on x for low values of x and negatively for large values, since the positive marginal contribution of
e to social cost is increasing whereas its negative marginal contribution (through abatement) is decreasing.
A linear contract is not able to deal optimally with this non-linear shape.
14We get AG = AI if W ≤
√
(1 + ρ2) and AG = AS if W ≥
√
(1 + ρ2).
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small, the impact of pollution is not very important and reducing is not worth the cost
of implementing an EMS. Proposition 3 states under which conditions P
(
S, tS
)
is socially
preferred to P
(
I, tI
)
and vice versa when A is big enough to discard LF. The results are
mainly governed by the weighted preference ratio (WPR) defined as
W ≡
δ
c
(
γ
σ2+µ2
)
+ 1
δ
c
(σ2 + µ2) + 1
. (8)
Proposition 3 If A ≥ AG the G-optimum is determined by the following results:
1. If W ≤
√
1 + ρ2, the G-optimum is P(I, tI).
2. If
√
1 + ρ2 ≤ W ≤ 1+ ρ2, there exists Aˆ such that the G-optimum is P(S, tS) if A ≤ Aˆ
and P(I, tI) if A ≥ Aˆ.
3. If W ≥ 1 + ρ2, the G-optimum is P(S, tS).
With indifference when the inequalities hold with ”=” 
Figure 2 shows that the range where the G-optimum is P (S, tS) widens with W and so
this ratio determines to what extent S is preferred to I. W combines two elements. The
first trades-off social and private concerns by means of the ratio δ
c
(importance of emissions
vs. the cost of effort). If δ
c
is high, S tends to be preferred to I since it tends to generate
more abatement effort.15
The second factor is the distribution of x. Higher variance makes S less appealing
since, being more rigid, it makes it more difficult to react to a changing environment. The
4th-order moment γ favors S as more probability mass is located closely around the mean
and in the tails. With more mass around the mean, x is more likely to be close to its mean,
15This can be checked by inspecting Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. Additionally, it can be proved
that, the abatement effort in the S-optimum is not lower than the expected effort in the I-optimum, i.e.,
eS
(
tS
)
≥ E eI
(
tI
)
, i.e., it is not only the case that those firms adopting S privately tend to exert more
abatement effort, but it is also socially optimal that they do so.
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which makes S more efficient. More mass in the tails also favors S because, as we have
discussed above, under I the firm tends to over-abate in the higher tail.
4.2 Conflicts between social and private plans and optimal poli-
cies
In this Section we explore under which conditions firms’ interests conflict with those of the
regulator in the sense that some socially optimal policies cannot be implemented. To this
end, we introduce the concept of implementable policy.
Definition 3 A policy P (EMS0, t0) is said to be implementable if, given the tax rate
t0, it is optimal for the firm to adopt EMS0, where EMS0 ∈ {I, S, LF}.
As an example, consider the situation depicted in Figure 3. The G-optimum is P
(
S, tS
)
but it cannot be implemented since, under t = tS, the firm will adopt I rather than S.
Then, under tS actual social cost would be E SCI(t
S), well above E SCS(t
S). Anticipating
this undesired event, the regulator can ”distort” the tax. By ”distorting” we mean to
select a t different from the G-optimum value, with the aim to induce the firm to make an
adoption decision more compatible with social interests. In our example, by setting t = t∗,
it is possible to induce the firm to adopt S,16 with a social cost equal to E SCS(t
∗), which
is above the global minimum value, but below E SCI(t
S), what would prevail under tS.
An obvious case of disagreement happens when the G-optimum is P
(
S, tS
)
and ρ ≥ 1.
In this case, the firm never adopts S (see Proposition 2). Then, the regulator’s options
would be PLF and P
(
I, tI
)
. For simplicity, we rule out this case by introducing the
following technical assumption:
16At t∗ the firm would be indifferent between S and I. We arbitrarily assume that firms are naive in
the sense that, when they are indifferent, they choose the system that the regulator prefers.
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Assumption 1: ρ ∈
(√
3
3
, 1
)
.
This is a two-fold assumption since it eliminates two cases. First, it rules out ρ ≥ 1.
The reason to disregard this case is that when ρ ≥ 1 firms will never adopt S, what
makes P
(
S, tS
)
irrelevant (see Proposition 2). Second, Assumption 1 implies ρ >
√
3
3
, what
restricts our discussion to the region in which, under I, there are incentive rents, which is
one of the key elements of our discussion. The ρ ≤
√
3
3
case can be studied in a similar
way, but it provides no additional insights and it makes the calculus more cumbersome.
Clearly, LF can be implemented if t is low enough (specifically, t < tI). Implementing
the S-optimum requires t∗ ≤ tS since, otherwise, the firm would choose I when facing tS.
Symmetrically, P
(
I, tI
)
requires t∗ ≥ tI since, otherwise, the firm would adopt S when
facing tI . Lemma 3 states the implementability of the local optima in terms of the tax
thresholds and in terms of the BAU emissions.
Lemma 3 P
(
S, tS
)
is implementable if and only if tS ≥ t∗ and P
(
I, tI
)
is implementable
if and only if t∗ ≥ tI ≥ tI . Moreover, there exist two thresholds, A
S, AI , such that
P
(
S, tS
)
is implementable if and only if A ≥ AS and P
(
I, tI
)
is implementable if and only
if AI ≤ A ≤ A
I

According to Lemma 3 P
(
S, tS
)
is implementable when A is high enough, whereas
P
(
I, tI
)
requires that A is not too high (it cannot be too low either, in order to avoid
LF ). Therefore, under optimal taxation, highly polluting firms tends to adopt S since
a higher A makes it more probable that tS > t∗ holds, and therefore, the S-optimum is
implementable. But if A is high, it is also more likely that t∗ < tI holds, what implies that
the I-optimum is not implementable. So, the larger A, the more likely it is that there is a
conflict in the direction that the social planner prefers I and the firm prefers S. We
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say that there is overadoption when the firm tends to adopt S more often than it is socially
desirable. As a policy conclusion, Lemma 3 states that overadoption tends to appear when
BAU emissions are high.
Conversely, I is more attractive for firms with low A. The lower A, the more likely
t∗ > tI will hold (P
(
I, tI
)
is implementable) but also tS < t∗ (P
(
S, tS
)
is not). Then,
the smaller A, the more likely is the event of underadoption in the sense that the firm
tends to adopt S less often than it is socially desirable. Table 1 and Figure 4 illustrate the
implications of Proposition 3 and Lemma 3.
Table 1. Conflicts between private and social plans
Figure 4 reveals that, when A is very low, the pollution problem is not very severe
and both the firm and the planner prefer LF. This situation is represented in the white
area labelled as ”no conflict LF”, where ”no conflict” means that the G-optimum is imple-
mentable. When both A and the WPR are large, public and private preferences are aligned
towards S (”no conflict S”). The fact that S entails a higher set-up cost (see Section 3)
causes that large and heavily polluting firms are more prone to adopt it, while a higher
value of the WPR also implies a stronger social preference towards S (see Proposition 3).
Similarly, for low values of W and intermediate values of A, the regulator and the firm
concur on I (”no conflict I”). For other combinations, conflicts between public and private
interests arise, resulting in over and underadoption (striped areas in the figure).
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The problem faced by the government is to find the best policy that is compatible
with the firm’s decision. Label the solution to this problem as implementable (or feasible)
optimum, or simply F -optimum, as introduced in the following definition.
Definition 4 The feasible optimum, or F -optimum, is a policy, say P
(
ÊMS, tˆ
)
, that
minimizes the expected social cost subject to the constraint that P
(
ÊMS, tˆ
)
is imple-
mentable.
When A is small enough, specifically A < AF ≡ min{AI , A
S/2}, the F -optimum in-
volves LF since LF it is the G-optimum and it is implementable. Otherwise (i.e. A ≥ AF ),
it can be proved (see Lemma 4, in Appendix 2) that tˆ can only be either tS, tI or t∗.
Appendix 1 provides a complete formal characterization of the F -optimal policies de-
pending on BAU emissions and the WPR. To get an intuitive idea of how the F -optimum
looks like (and hence how the regulator should deal with conflicts) we use an example that
is shown in Figure 5. The G-optimum areas (delimited by dotted lines) are superposed
with the F -optimum areas.
Consistently with the classification shown in Table 1, there are three non-conflict regions
where the G-optimum is implementable, labelled respectively as ”No conflict (S)”, ”No
conflict (I)” and ”No conflict (LF)”. In these cases, the optimal decision of the planner
is to implement the G−optimum. The cases of conflict can be dealt with in two different
ways. The general idea is that the planner should incentivize the firm to implement the
(socially) ”right” type of EMS if this can be done with a ”moderate” tax distortion and
should accept that the implemented EMS is different from the G−optimum otherwise. To
get a better understanding of the specific meaning of ”moderate” in this framework, we
discuss now the shape of the relevant areas with the help of Figure 5.
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Notice first that LF happens more often in the F -optimum than in the G-optimum.
Indeed, between AG and AF the global optimum P
(
S, tS
)
it is not implementable and any
attempt to implement an EMS (either S or I) would require a strong tax distortion that
would be socially worse than LF. This area is labelled as ”S to LF” to indicate that the
G-optimum involves S whereas the F -optimum involves LF . The main message in this
area is that, A being small, the social relevance of emissions is limited and, therefore, it
is better to accept the LF level rather than the inefficiency costs associated to the tax
distortion. Let us focus now on the regions where LF is not F−optimal.
Consider now the region where the G-optimum involves I. If A is low enough, P
(
I, tI
)
is implementable and there is no conflict. If, on the contrary, A is high, overadoption arises.
How the planner deals with this event depends on A. If A is close enough to AI ,17 it is
profitable for the planner to apply a moderate tax distortion in order to induce the firm
to adopt I. The resulting policy is P (I, t∗) (area labelled ”Tax distortion (I)” in Figure
5).18 If A is very large the F -optimal policy involves S (area labelled as ”I to S”), which
means that the government renounces to get I implemented because inducing firms to do
so would require a strong tax distortion.
When the G-optimum involves S, it is implementable (no conflict) only if A is large
enough. Otherwise, there is underadoption. The policy options to deal with this conflict
are determined by the weighted preference ratio. If W is large enough19 the social prefer-
ence towards S is so strong that I must be ruled out and the tax is always distorted (to
17In Appendix 1 we give a precise specification for ”close enough”. Specifically, we show that there exists
one threshold A∗ such that, if AI < A ≤ A∗, it is better to distort the tax and force the firm to implement
I and, if A ≤ A∗, the planner should opt to accept S instead of I.
18By a ”moderate tax distortion” we mean that t∗ is not very far from the G-optimum value, since by
construction, when A = AI , tI = t∗ and, by continuity, if A is close to AI , t∗ is close to tI . If A is above
A∗, we say that there is a ”strong” tax distortion in the sense that t∗ would be very far from tI .
19In Proposition 4 (Appendix 1) we define a threshold W , which determines the meaning of ”large
enough” in this case.
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t∗) to make sure than the firm chooses S. It also pays to distort the tax for intermediate
values of the WPR if A is high enough.20 Even if S is globally optimal, when the social
preference towards S (as measured by W ) is moderate and A is not very large it is more
preferable to induce I because encouraging firms to adopt S would entail a sharp distortion
(this corresponds to the ”S to I” region).
4.3 Win-win-win introduction of Standardized EMS
Assume that the planner always aims to set the F -optimum. Consider that, starting
from a situation where only the LF and informal EMS exist, the possibility to adopt a
standardized EMS is introduced. Corollary 2 identifies a case in which this introduction
results in a win-win-win situation in the sense that it is simultaneously profitable for the
firm, the society and the environment. Moreover these improvements are consistent with
a tax reduction.
Corollary 2 Consider an initial situation in which S is not available. If W ∈ (1 + ρ2, 2)
there exists a threshold AL ∈
(
AI , AS
)
such that, if A > AL the introduction of S entails
an improvement from the point of view of the firm (lower expected private cost), the society
(lower expected social cost) and the environment (lower expected emissions). This comes
along with a reduction of the tax rate 
When S is not available, the F -optimal policy can only be either LF or P
(
I, tI
)
. When
S is introduced, there is a wider array of options, what opens the door for improvements.
From a policy point of view, this result suggests that those countries or regions in which
20Specifically, this situation is defined by 1 + ρ2 < W < W and A > A∗.
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standardized systems are not well developed should seriously consider the possibility to
foster them since making this possibility more available for the firms could be socially
desirable from several points of view.
Technically, attaining the win-win-win situation referred to in Corollary 2 requires two
conditions. First, the improvement potential can only be realized if the EMS selected by
the firm shifts to S, what requires A being large enough (see Proposition 4). Second, the
WPR cannot be either too low or too high. If it is very low, the change might be beneficial
for firms, but not for society.21 On the other hand, if W > 2, the change would reduce
the social cost, but it would result in a tax increase (tS > tI) that might increase firms’
costs.22
5 Predictive ability and policy implications
The aim of this section is twofold: first, we gather all our policy implications and second
we review some of our predictions in the light of empirical evidence.
5.1 Policy implications
The main policy implications of our findings are the following. First, we find a two-fold
complementarity relationship between standardized EMS and incentive policies. On the
one hand, firms that adopt a standardized EMS tend, on average, to devote more resources
to pollution abatement than firms that do not, but emissions will not be lower without the
21To see this, note that the difference between tI and tS decreases with W . If W < 1 + ρ2, tI − tS is
very high and large firms gain by switching to S. But, in this range, shifting to S is socially inefficient for
large values of A (Specifically, A > Aˆ. See Proposition 3).
22It can be shown that if tI is close enough to tS (W not very far from 2), there can be a range of
parameters where (large) firms may gain by shifting to S although this change involves a tax increase
rather than a decrease.
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support of adequate public incentives. On the other hand, standardized systems are more
prone to be adopted under tougher environmental policies.
Second, the voluntary nature of EMS adoption implies that, when designing public
environmental policy, the government should pay attention, not only to the impact on
the level of abatement effort, but also on the EMS adoption decision. This double effect
introduces the possibility of a conflict between firm’s and regulator’s interests. As a con-
sequence, it could be optimal for the planner to choose a suboptimal value for the tax rate
in order to induce a change in the adoption decision.
Third, S-adoption is more likely for mature and well established firms facing a lower
level of technological uncertainty. Moreover, there is a minimum threshold on taxes below
which firms would not be willing to adopt a standardized EMS. This threshold entails an
endogenous set-up cost that will typically hinder small or newcomer firms from adopting
S. Once we take the optimal behavior of the planner into account, we also get that large
or highly pollutant firms are more prone to adopt standardized systems, what could result
in overadoption and the other way around for small firms.
This bigger tendency of big polluters to adopt standardized systems suggests a link
between EMS adoption and corporate social responsibility (CSR) or environmental com-
mitment (in this respect see, for example, Pedersen 2007). To what extent the adoption
of EMAS or ISO 14001 can be taken as a signal of environmental or social responsibility?
Although S adopting firms tend, on average, to abate more and pollute less, this connec-
tion is not necessarily motivated by a stronger environmental commitment, as it can be
explained as the result of a cost-minimizing behavior. Indeed, we get that the adoption of
standardized EMS by mature and big (or highly pollutant) firms can be easily explained
in terms of managerial efficiency gains and cost saving and, as a matter of fact, big firms
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might adopt S more often than it is socially optimal. On the contrary, S-adoption can be
seen as a more credible signal of social responsibility when it is observed in small or new
firms, for which the cost saving effect is much weaker.
And the fourth policy implication is that, under some circumstances, introducing the
possibility to adopt a standardized EMS can be a particularly good news since both the
firm and the society might get better-off, with less pollution even at a lower tax rate. This
can be a relevant policy warning for those countries or regions in which S systems are still
not well established.
5.2 Predictions and connections with empirical evidence
Our theoretical predictions are consistent with empirical evidence in some respects. As a
first connection, empirical evidence reveals that one of the most common motivators for
adopting S is to ensure environmental regulation compliance. For example, in Morrow and
Rondinelli (2002) four out of five large German energy companies interviewed reported
that regulatory compliance and legal certainty were primary motivators. This evidence
is consistent with our findings in the sense that a more demanding regulation (in our
framework, a higher value of t) provides more incentives to adopt S.
Proposition 1 states that those firms adopting a standardized EMS tend, on average,
to make more abatement effort. A similar finding has been made in some empirical works.
For example, Anton et al. (2004) find that the adoption of a more comprehensive EMS
has a significant negative impact on the intensity of toxic releases. Johnstone et al. (2007)
conclude that the presence of an EMS have a significant positive impact on environmental
performance. Both Anton et al. (2004) and Johnstone et al. (2007) also identify in
empirical terms the two effects reported in Section 4: a marginal effect in the determination
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of the abatement effort and a qualitative or discrete effect on the adoption decision.
Proposition 1 also states that this higher abatement effort results in lower (expected)
emissions only if the incentives provided by the public environmental policy are strong
enough, what suggests a complementarity between standardized systems and environmen-
tal economic policies. Such complementarity is reinforced by the fact that standardized
systems are more prone to be adopted under tough public policies. A complementarity
relationship between the adoption of standardized EMS and environmental policy has also
been empirically demonstrated in some studies. For example, Arimura et. al. (2008) show
that ”regulations do not significantly weaken the effect of ISO 14001. This finding con-
firms the relevance of concurrent use of traditional policy instruments and the voluntary
approach” (p. 294). Blackman and Guerrero (2011) find that regulatory fines spur certi-
fication and, therefore, command-and-control regulation is a key driver of participation in
ISO 14001. Johnstone et al. (2007) conclude that some (general purpose) environmental
policies have a positive influence on the decision to introduce an EMS.
According to Proposition 2, standardized systems tend to be subject to an endogenous
adoption cost higher than that of informal systems. The existence of such an adoption
costs is well documented empirically. See, for example, Bansal and Bogner (2002) quoted
in the introduction. It is natural to conclude that such adoption cost will typically discour-
age small firms from adopting a standardized EMS, which suggests a positive correlation
between firm’s size and S-adoption. Proposition 2 also suggests that a standardized EMS is
more likely to be voluntarily adopted by well established firms that are subject to a lower
level of uncertainty (as measured by ρ). In several empirical studies, such as those by
Nakamura et al. (2001), Bansal and Bogner (2002), Grolleau et al. (2007) and Blackman
and Guerrero (2011), it has also been reported that there is a positive correlation between
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size (as proxied by BAU emissions) and S-adoption. Our results are also consistent with
this result although it is fair to acknowledge that, in our model, this positive relationship
between the size of firms and their tendency to adopt a standardized EMS arises once we
assume that the planner behaves optimally when designing the environmental policy.
6 Conclusions and guidelines for future research
We have developed a model where a policy maker gives incentives to firms to reduce
pollution and firms, in turn, offer some internal incentive scheme to the environmental
manager. A standardized EMS increases the control that the firm has over its internal
abatement processes but it introduces some degree of rigidity. The advantage of an informal
system is the ability to make quicker decisions without being constrained by a established
protocol, but this comes at the cost of giving up some internal control. This model allows
us to rationalize some empirical features of EMS adoption.
We have intentionally built a very simple model by including several assumptions, the
relaxation of which might result in promising extensions. Although a fully-fledged analysis
of any of these extensions entails technical challenges that are beyond the scope of this
paper, a brief discussion seems relevant.
Firstly, we have assumed a risk-neutral agent endowed with a limited liability constraint,
which makes incentive provision costly and, as noted by several authors, the implications
of this element are economically similar to the existence of risk-aversion.23 To check this
parallelism in our framework, it is possible to build a version of the model with a risk-
averse agent. So, we have explored the mean-variance approach by assuming that the
23See Sappington (1983), for a leading article, or Laffont and Martimort (2009), for a more comprehensive
discussion.
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agent’s preferences can be represented by a mean-variance utility function.24 We conclude
that the optimal behavior of the manager as defined by the ICC is the same as above
but one difference arises at the participation constraint (PC) because, under risk aversion,
the manager must be compensated for risk taking, which entails an additional cost for
effort provision that implies an inefficient provision of effort, the same that happened in
our benchmark model, although the reason is different.25 Summing up, our approach is
qualitatively similar to assuming that the agent is risk averse with a particular degree of
risk aversion since, in both cases, the asymmetric information problem entails a distortion
in the optimal level of effort. The difference arises in the source of the distortion: in the
risk-averse case incentives are distorted to reduce the risk-taking compensation whereas in
our case incentives are distorted to avoid paying extra rents. The most promising question
to be tackled in this line is a careful sensitivity analysis of the risk aversion coefficient.
Secondly, we have deliberately disregarded production. The simplest way to include
output in our framework is to assume that production and abatement are separable deci-
sions, the former being taken by the firm and the latter by the manager, while production
and pollution are linked by assuming a constant pollution intensity in the absence of abate-
ment.26 In this new setting, optimal abatement effort remains unchanged both under S and
under I, and so does the firm’s adoption decision, while, due to separability, the produc-
tion decisions are the same regardless the EMS adopted. The most important issue affects
optimal taxation because of the negative effect of taxes on production. Now the firm has
an additional instrument to reduce the tax bill: not only she can increase abatement but
24V = E(w) − r2var(w) − C(e), r being the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient.
25It can be shown that there exists one value for the risk aversion coefficient such that the optimal bonus
b is the same in both approaches.
26Specifically, assume that the laissez-faire emissions are A (q) = αq, where α is the pollution intensity
coefficient an q is output.
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also she can reduce production. Nonetheless, the effects of all the relevant parameters (δ,
c, µ, σ2 and γ) on the optimal tax are qualitatively the same. A complete analysis of this
extension would involve considering the effect on output variation on consumers’ surplus,
which is not present in our model.
We have also assumed a linear wage contract under I. As it is well known in the
literature, the curvature of the optimal contract depends on the attitude of the agents to
risk and so a linear contract is not optimal in general terms (see e.g. Holmstrom 1979).
Some authors have shown that linear contracts are optimal in a number of settings (see
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987 or Bose, Pal and Sappington, 2011) but our purpose is
not to design a fully optimal contract, but to choose a simple pattern that captures the
introduction of incentives in a more or less standard and realistic way. Since the planner
anticipates the firm’s behavior, inevitably, the linearity of the contract matters to determine
the optimal tax policy, but we also leave a complete characterization of optimal contracts
for future work.
It is also worthwhile to note that, when considering the costs of implementing a EMS,
we have focused just on labor costs. A thorough inclusion of all the costs could affect the
results. For example, a standardized EMS typically involves costly audits which are not
present in the cases of an informal EMS.
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7 Appendix 1: General characterization of the F -
optimal policy
Proposition 4 Let W ≡
√
2(1+ρ2)
1−ρ2 . Under Assumption 1 the F -optimal policy is charac-
terized as follows:
when W < W when W ≥W
PLF If A ≤ AI
P
(
I, tI
)
If AI ≤ A ≤ min
{
A∗, AI
}
P (I, t∗) If A∗ ≥ A > AI
P (S, t∗) If AS ≥ A > A∗
P
(
S, tS
)
If A ≥ max
{
A∗, AS
}
PLF If A ≤ AS/2
P (S, t∗) If AS ≥ A > AS/2
P
(
S, tS
)
If A ≥ AS
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with indifference when the conditions hold with ”=”, where A∗ is a unique threshold defined
when A > AF and W < W , such that the F -optimum involves EMS = S if A > A∗ and
EMS = I if A < A∗ 
8 Appendix 2: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 From Lemma 2 we know that eS =
tµ
c
≥
tSµ
c
is known with
certainty. E eI depends on t. Using Lemma 1, if tI < t < 2tI , eI = tI
x
c
=⇒ E eI = tI
µ
c
< eS
and if t > 2tI , eI =
tx
2c
and E eI =
tµ
2c
< tµ
c
. This proves the first part. To prove the second,
note that under S we have E (PS) = A− t
µ2
c
. Regarding I we need to check two cases:
1. If t < 2tI , E (PI) = A −
√
2(µ2+σ2)U
c
and we get E (PS) ≤ E (PI) ⇐⇒ t ≥
c
µ2
√
2(µ2+σ2)U
c
= 1
µ
√
2cU (1 + ρ2) = tS
√
(1 + ρ2) = te. By direct comparison, te < 2tI ⇐⇒
ρ < 1. So, if ρ > 1, E (PS) > E (PI) for any t ∈ [tS, 2tI ] .
2. If t > 2tI , E (PI) = A −
t
2c
(µ2 + σ2) and we get E (PS) ≤ E (PI) ⇐⇒ 2µ
2 ≥
µ2 + σ2 ⇐⇒ ρ ≤ 1. If ρ < 1 we also have te < 2tI < t
Proof of Proposition 2 We compare ECI and ECS (from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2).
When tI < t < 2tI , (i) at t = tI , E CI(tI) < E CS(tI) and (ii) ECI is linear and ECS is
strictly concave in t in (tI , 2tI). Both functions can cross no more than once. At t = 2tI
we get
E CS(2tI) ≤ E CI(2tI)⇐⇒ 2t
2
I
µ2
2c
> 2tI
√
2(σ2 + µ2)U
c
− U ⇐⇒ ρ <
1
√
3
=
√
3
3
and so both function cross in the (tI , 2tI) range iff ρ <
√
3
3
. Under ρ <
√
3
3
, E CS (t) <
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E CI (t) if and only if
t2
µ2
2c
> t
√
2(σ2 + µ2)U
c
−U ⇐⇒ t > t∗ ≡
√
2cU
µ2
[√
σ2 + µ2 +
√
σ2
]
=
√
2cU
[√
ρ2 + 1 + ρ
]
.
If ρ >
√
3
3
, E CI and E CS cannot cross for t
∗ < 2tI . So, if the crossing point exists it must
be such that t∗ > 2tI . Indeed,
E CS < E CI ⇐⇒
t2(σ2 + µ2)
4c
<
t2µ2
2c
− U ⇐⇒ t > t∗ ≡ 2
√
cU
µ2 − σ2
> 2tI ⇐⇒ ρ >
√
3
3
which also implies that if ρ ≥ 1 (or, equivalently, σ2 > µ2) E CS > E CI ∀t
Proof of Corollary 1 According to Proposition 1, ρ < 1 and t ≥ t∗ must hold. Since
no firm adopts S if ρ ≥ 1 (Proposition 2), it is left to check if te < t∗. When ρ <
√
3
3
, te <
t∗ ⇐⇒ 1
µ
√
2cU (1 + ρ2) <
√
2cU
µ
[
ρ+
√
ρ2 + 1
]
⇐⇒
√
(1+ρ2)
ρ+
√
1+ρ2
< 1 ⇐⇒ ρ > 0, while, when
ρ ≥
√
3
3
, te < t∗ ⇐⇒ 1
µ
√
2cU (1 + ρ2) < 2
µ
√
cU
(1−ρ2) ⇐⇒ (1− ρ
2) (1 + ρ2) < 2 ⇐⇒ ρ ≥ −1
which always holds.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proposition 2 and the definitions of tS and tI determine that, under Assumption 1,
P
(
S, tS
)
is implementable iff tS ≥ t∗ and P
(
I, tI
)
is implementable iff t∗ ≥ tI . Regarding
P
(
S, tS
)
, we have t∗ > tS, what implies that, if P
(
S, tS
)
is implementable, then tS =
Acδ
δ(µ2+σ2)+c
. Using the expressions for tS and t∗ we have tS ≥ t∗ ⇔ A ≥ AS, where
AS ≡ 2
√
U
c(µ2−σ2)
[
(µ2 + σ2) + c
δ
]
. Regarding P
(
I, tI
)
, we need A ≥ AI to ensure that
I is preferred to LF. If A ≥ AI there are two relevant cases (whether A ≷ 2AI). If
A ≥ 2AI , we have t
∗ ≥ tI ⇐⇒ A ≤ AI , where AI ≡
√
U
c(µ2−σ2)
[
γ
(µ2+σ2)
+ c
δ
]
. If A < 2AI ,
tI ≤ t∗ always holds because of Assumption 1. So, AI ≤ A ≤ 2AI is a sufficient condition
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for P
(
I, tI
)
to be implementable. Under Assumption 1, 2AI ≤ A
I always holds and so
AI ≤ A ≤ 2AI is necessary and sufficient
Lemma 4 Assume A ≥ AF . The tax rate associated to the F -optimum, tˆ, can only be
either tS, tI or t∗. Moreover, if tS 6= tI , the following statements hold:
If tS < t∗ tˆ ∈
{
tI ,t∗
}
If tI > t∗ tˆ ∈
{
tS,t∗
}
If tS < t∗ < tI tˆ = t∗
Proof of Lemma 4
When considering the adoption decision, the policy maker faces the following actual
cost function:
Eˆ SC (t) =

EI SC (t) if t < t
∗
Min {EI SC (t) , ES SC (t)} if t = t
∗
ES SC (t) if t > t
∗
(9)
Assume, by contradiction, that t0 minimizes Eˆ SC (t) and t0 /∈
{
tS, tI , t∗
}
. Since t 6= t∗, by
continuity, there is an interval (t0 − ε, t0 + ε) where t0 is included and t
∗ is not. Therefore, t0
can be marginally increased or reduced without inducing a change of EMS. Assume t0 > t
∗,
what implies Eˆ SC = E SC in this interval. Since t0 6= t
S (i.e., t0 6= argminESSC (t)) and
ES SC (t) is a strictly convex function, at t0 the slope of ES SC (t) is either strictly positive
or negative, and ES SC (t0) can be reduced either by marginally increasing or reducing t
without inducing a change of EMS. So, t0 cannot minimize Eˆ SC (t). A similar argument
applies if t0 < t
∗ (what implies Eˆ SC (t0) = EI SC (t0)). Thus, the only candidates to
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minimize Eˆ SC (t) are tS, tI and t∗. This proves the first part.
If tS < t∗, Eˆ SC
(
tS
)
= EI SC
(
tS
)
(the firm adopts I). Since tS 6= tI , at tS,
EI SC do not reach a minimum, and EI SC (t) being a strictly convex function there
must be an interval
(
tS − ε, tS + ε
)
where t∗ is not included and we can marginally de-
crease EI SC (t) by increasing or reducing t without inducing a change of EMS. Therefore,
tS 6= argmin Eˆ SC (t). A similar argument proves that, if tI > t∗, tI 6= argmin Eˆ SC (t).
Combining both arguments, if tS < t∗ < tI , the only candidate to minimize Eˆ SC (t) is
t∗ 
Proof of Corollary 2 Regarding costs, from Proposition 4, there are two ranges.
First, W ∈
(
1 + ρ2, 4
3−ρ2
)
. If A ∈ (A∗, AS) the F -optimum is P(S, t∗) and there exists
A∗∗ ∈ (A∗, AS) such that for any A > A∗∗ social costs decrease with respect to P(I, tI).
Second, W ∈
(
4
3−ρ2 , 2
)
. For any A ∈ (A∗, AS), EI SC(tI) > ES SC(t∗). In both ranges,
if A > AS P(tS , S) is the G-optimum and it is implementable, what implies ES SC(t
S) ≤
EI SC(t
I).
Firms become better-off if it is optimal for them to move from I to S, i.e., A > A∗.
Therefore, both the firm and the society gets simultaneously better-off if A > AL where
AL = A∗∗ if W ∈
(
1 + ρ2, 4
3−ρ2
)
and AL = A∗ if W ∈
(
4
3−ρ2 , 2
)
.
Regarding emissions, there are two cases: (a) If A > AS, EP (S, tS) < EP (I, tI) ⇐⇒
µ2δA
δθ+c
> θδA
δ
γ
θ
+c
and the latter condition holds always that W > 1+ρ2. (b) if A ∈ (A∗, AS) us-
ing the relevant expressions we have EP (S, t∗) < EP (I, tI) ⇐⇒ A < 2
√
U
c(2µ2−θ)
δ
γ
θ
+c
δ
µ2
θ
<
AS where the last inequality is true when W > 1 + ρ2 . Regarding taxes, there are two
cases: If A > AS > AI the F -optimum is P (S, ts) and it is easy to proof that AS > AI
⇐⇒ tS < tI . If AI < AL < A < AS the F -optimum is P (S, t∗) and Lemma 3 implies
t∗ < tI 
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9 Appendix 3: Figures captions
FIGURE 1: Optimal EMS for the firm
FIGURE 2: Global optimum
FIGURE 3: Conflict between firm’s and social interests
FIGURE 4: Social and Private (dis)agreements
FIGURE 5: F -optimal policies (”I to S” mean that the G-optimum involves I and the
F -optimum S and so on)
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